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Centralizing Data Management with Considerations of 
Uncertainty and Information-based Flexibility 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper applies the theory of real options to analyze how the value of information-based 
flexibility should affect the decision to centralize or decentralize data management under low 
and high uncertainty. This study makes two main contributions. First, we show that in the 
presence of low uncertainty, centralization of data-management decisions creates more total 
surplus for the firm as the similarity of business units increases. In contrast, in the presence of 
high uncertainty, centralization creates more total surplus as the dissimilarity of business 
units increases. The pivoting distinction trades the benefit of reduction of uncertainty from 
dissimilar businesses for centralization (with cost saving) against the benefit of flexibility 
from decentralization. Second, the framework helps senior management evaluate the trade-
offs in data centralization that drive different business models of the firm. We illustrate the 
application of these propositions formally using an analytical model, and informally using 
case vignettes and simulation. 
 
Keywords: economics of IS, real options, uncertainty, flexibility and information systems 
decentralization. 
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Introduction 
Data centralization efforts within firms often follow a familiar pattern [1][8]: conversations 
with senior executives reveal numerous incidents whereby they start a major data-
centralization project only to terminate it before completion. The frequency with which this 
happens can be partly explained by the failure of such efforts to fully take into account how 
data management enables a firm to react flexibly to uncertainty in the environment. This 
paper addresses this gap by applying the theory of real options to account for the value of 
flexibility in the context of uncertainty in order to decide when to centralize data 
management.  
              The degree of centralization within an organization can affect performance and 
innovation [18]. Centralization means that decision rights affecting interdependent groups are 
concentrated in a single authority, whereas decentralization distributes those rights, usually as 
authority granted to the groups nearest the data collection [25, 35]. 
Consider a canonical example based on interviews conducted at a financial services 
firm, Thomson Reuters.1 One of Thomson Reuters’ key businesses is that of infrastructure 
provider and information artery to the financial services industry. During the 1980s and 90s, 
the business was run geographically, with the business head of each country having the 
authority to collect data and serve the client needs of their own country. The data was held 
country by country for the plethora of products. In fact, there were over 2,500 products by the 
late 1990s, which resulted in a high cost of data maintenance. Thomson Reuters has multiple 
business units, each with hundreds of information systems and databases to support these 
operations. The decentralized systems and databases cater for the specialized requirements of 
that business unit or to adapt rapidly to meet local changing requirements. However, at the 
turn of the millennium, rapid changes in customer needs, financial innovation, and Internet 
access, created significant uncertainty and a new set of challenges for Thomson Reuters in 
gathering, disseminating and responding to new information. On the one hand, there was a 
need to centralize data management to improve coordination and reduce costs. On the other 
hand, decentralization enables better local tailoring. Therefore, management faces the 
constant challenge of whether the center or the business units should have the authority to 
collect data and use it to make decisions. In particular, how should management think about 
whether to centralize or decentralize data management in the context of environmental 
uncertainty? This choice affects the business model of the firm and its innovative capability. 
We will discuss resolution of the Thomson Reuters’ challenge and its relationship to our 
model in subsequent sections. 
We define data management as the authority to collect data, as well as the decision 
rights to use the data. In this paper, centralizing data management is the allocation of 
authority to collect data, as well as the rights to make decisions using the data to the central 
unit. Decentralization occurs when such decision rights reside with the business units. The 
allocation of such decision rights to the central unit or the business units influences data 
collection. Therefore, we assume that the rights to decide what to collect and to use the data 
                                                 
1 The Thomson Corporation and Reuters Group plc combined in 2008 to form Thomson Reuters. Here, we use Thomson 
Reuters to refer to the firm both before and after the combination. 
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reside with the same unit. Hence, we focus on the decision rights to collect and use data and 
their effect on the total surplus of the firm. 
Centralized versus decentralized decision-making has been examined extensively in 
the information systems and management literature [see 15 and 18]. At the heart of the 
discussion is the trade-off between the incentives at the center versus those of the business 
unit and the benefits from coordination versus costs. On the one hand, the center might obtain 
information from the business units to enhance coordination. On the other hand, the business 
units might have better information due to proximity to the local conditions and, hence, are 
better able to serve customers. Moreover, the center and business units might have different 
costs of information management. The decision to centralize or decentralize depends on the 
optimum trade-off between these benefits and costs [13]. Studies have shown that the 
information systems’ design problem is intertwined with the organizational design issue of 
centralization versus decentralization as it relocates information among decision-makers [see 
15, 17, 26]. Studies have examined centralization and decentralization with co-location of 
information and decision rights [4, 38], ownership of information assets [15], and the role of 
standardization on database design [42]. However, as illustrated by the challenges faced by 
Thomson Reuters, the degree of uncertainty in the environment also affects the decision to 
centralize or decentralize data management. The extant literature on information management 
has not examined how the degree of uncertainty affects the decision to centralize or 
decentralize data management, which is the question we address in this paper. 
We classify the degree of uncertainty as low or high. We identify uncertainty here 
with variability of the environment. As in the case of information entropy [28][39], a more 
uncertain environment is less predictable. High (low) uncertainty represents the case of high 
(low) variance in possible outcomes.  
Data management contributes to the total surplus of the firm by altering a firm's 
ability to react to an opportunity or limit a loss when change occurs. This is the value of 
information-based flexibility. Managers in industries experiencing significant environmental 
change (due to changes in competitive environments, consumer preferences or other shocks) 
often do not know what data they will need in order to react to change [31]. Collecting data in 
one period can help the firm leverage data collected in later periods. Local data can also 
benefit the business unit currently holding the data or other interdependent units that might 
need that data in the future. In this sense, the need to build in future requirements creates 
flexibility or option value for the firm [38, 11].  
We build a simple model to develop our framework that incorporates information-
based flexibility to help decide when it is optimal to centralize data management. The firm 
has to decide whether the center or the business units have the authority to collect data and 
the decision rights to use the data. For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that there are 
two business units and a central unit. The level of similarity between the business units 
determines the degree of cross-benefits between them whereby a higher degree of similarity 
implies higher joint pay-offs. The firm must collect some business-unit data in the first period 
in order to have the option to collect new data in the second period. Environmental 
uncertainty is resolved in the second period, after which the firm can collect further data in 
order to improve its response.  
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We model two decision-making structures. The centralized structure enables the 
center to coordinate between the two business units, taking into account the cross-benefit 
effects between business units as it decides the level of data collection. In contrast, in the 
decentralized structure, each individual business unit makes decisions to maximize its own 
profit without taking into account the cross-benefits to other units. The center, with its global 
view, accounts for the cross-benefit effects between business units and, with its scale, has 
lower costs. Yet, business units can react more flexibly to uncertainty than the center because 
local control permits closer tailoring to the local environment. Such closer tailoring of the 
data to suit the local environment entails higher associated costs. We then show how 
information-based flexibility arises as a result of uncertainty and irreversibility. Irreversibility 
in this context is the inability to undo a decision once it has been made. Therefore, the firm 
must consider uncertainty, irreversibility, and the cross-benefit effects between the business 
units when deciding whether to centralize data management. In addition, our model of data 
management seeks to analyze the benefits of coordination and diversity of information 
sources, as different structures produce different reductions in uncertainty. 
A key result is that, in the presence of low uncertainty, centralization becomes 
optimal as the similarity of business units increases – benefits from coordination dominate. 
On the other hand, in the presence of high uncertainty, centralization becomes optimal as the 
dissimilarity of business units increases – benefits from reduced uncertainty dominate. 
Dissimilar business units enable new information to be obtained by combining diverse 
information from separate perspectives. Such new information reduces uncertainty by 
reducing the variance in possible states of the environment. Centralization becomes attractive 
when reducing uncertainty is more valuable than the flexibility of allowing opportunistic 
local business decisions. Ironically, business units that are more similar provide more 
correlated information, which limits the uncertainty-reducing benefit from diverse sources of 
information. On a cost basis alone, standard theory might predict that centralizing similar 
business units is optimal but this ignores the uncertainty-reducing benefit of centralizing 
information from dissimilar business perspectives. Decentralization, in contrast, becomes 
attractive when reducing uncertainty is less valuable than the flexibility of allowing local 
business decisions. If the environment is predictable and there are no cross-benefits of 
decisions, then decentralizing autonomous decisions can add more to the total surplus of the 
firm. These cases, defined by high/low uncertainty reduction and high/low flexibility, interact 
with business-unit similarity to push optimal decision structures more or less toward 
centralization. We illustrate the application of these propositions formally using an analytical 
model and informally using case vignettes and simulation. 
We contribute to the information management literature by showing how the total 
surplus of the firm from information-based flexibility influences the decision to centralize 
data management. In particular, we show how such a decision depends on the degree of 
uncertainty (external to the firm) in the environment and the degree of similarity (internal to 
the firm) between business units. In addition, the framework helps senior management 
evaluate the criteria and trade-offs favoring data centralization across multiple decision 
contexts.  
This paper is organized as follows. First, we review the relevant literature on 
information management and option value. Then, we develop the model and discuss the main 
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drivers of the total surplus of the firm from information-based flexibility. We then explore the 
effects of low and high uncertainty; and we draw implications for economies of scope in 
information management across business units with different degrees of similarities in the 
presence of low uncertainty. Subsequently, we extend the case of similarity of business units 
in the presence of high uncertainty. Finally, we discuss the managerial implications and 
conclude. 
Relevant Literature 
 Our paper is related to, and borrows from, a variety of literature. 
Information Management 
Ownership of data can influence the effectiveness and success of information management 
[37]. Information is an intangible asset that benefits its owner [see 7, 23]. In the context of 
information management, the right to control is the ability to access, create and standardize 
data, as well as to determine access privileges for others2 [42]. A firm’s allocation of 
ownership rights on data between the center and the business units influences organizational 
design such as centralization and decentralization, which affects the total value of the firm. 
Studies have examined centralization/decentralization in the context of information 
management. Anand and Mendelson [4] study the effect of alternative coordination 
mechanisms, such as centralized, decentralized and distributed structures, on the performance 
of firms that face uncertain demand. The optimal structure depends upon the relative 
importance of both central and local knowledge. As local knowledge is specific and not 
amenable to statistical aggregation, the results show that decentralization outperforms 
centralization in spite of the latter’s superior ability to coordinate. Therefore, the study shows 
the benefit of co-locating decision rights with specific knowledge. In contrast, Nault [35] 
examines the impact of information technology on the profitability of different organizational 
design, such as hierarchy, decentralized and mixed models, when there is an information 
asymmetry between the central authority and the decentralized nodes. Moreover, there are 
global and local investments that are complementary and need to be coordinated. The authors 
show that co-location of investment decision rights and information might not be optimal 
when the cost of non-coordination is high.  
Brynjolfsson [15] discusses when centralization and decentralization is optimal under 
an incomplete contracts framework based on ownership of information assets. The basic 
premise is that complementary assets should be owned by the same agent when complete 
contracts are infeasible. Therefore, when there is a need for centralized coordination, 
ownership of the information asset should be with the centralized authority in order to 
improve incentives for all. Van Alstyne et al. [42] extend the incomplete contracts reasoning 
to database management to show when centralization and decentralization are optimal. 
However, the extant literature on information management has not examined the degree of 
uncertainty and how this influences the decision to centralize. In order to do so, we draw 
upon options theory.  
                                                 
2 It is useful to note that this right and its associated privileges accrue to the owners regardless of where such information is 
located. For example, data could be physically located in one place but there could be many owners, each with a residual 
right of control over specific parts of that data. Alternatively, data could be owned and controlled by one unit but 
physically located in a distributed manner at various business units. 
 7 
Options Theory 
An option is the right, but not the obligation, to take an action in the future [19]. The field of 
real options applies options reasoning to investment and commitment decisions, identifying 
the factors that influence the time at which investors choose whether or not to invest. The 
combination of an unfavorable outcome and the commitment to an irreversible course of 
action can be worse than being flexible by keeping an option open and acting only after 
further information is revealed. Therefore, the value of the option derives from two principal 
sources: uncertainty and irreversibility [12]. We argue that firms face many strategic 
decisions that display both uncertainty and irreversibility. Uncertainty stems from future 
conditions in the external environment; irreversibility is the inability to undo or reverse a 
decision once it has been made. In uncertain environments, firms have a short window of 
opportunity to react to unforeseen events. In these circumstances, versatility and the ability to 
adapt to the changing environment are critical sources of value. In a strategic context, 
flexibility is a function of being informed about opportunities as uncertainty unfolds. A firm 
becomes informed by collecting relevant data, and must decide whether to purchase the 
option value by investing in data and creating information-based flexibility value.  
A number of studies have discussed the use of options reasoning in information 
systems decision-making [21]. Dos Santos [20] uses real options models for valuing new IS 
projects. The study shows how the pre-investment value could increase due to learning and, 
hence, future investments are treated as optional. Kumar [27] examines how options values of 
investments in new information technologies vary according to project risks. Taudes, 
Feurstein and Mild [40] show how strategic growth options are valuable in the case of 
software platforms when managers can intervene across the project’s trajectory to create 
opportunities for follow-on investments. Benaroch and Kauffman [9] extend the use of 
options models to the development of point-of-sale (POS) debit services, where the issue is 
not whether to invest but when to invest. In a companion paper, Benaroch and Kauffman [10] 
show how options models can be used for strategic IS investment decisions by incorporating 
a project’s idiosyncratic risks into the calculations. In addition, Benaroch et al. [11] use a case 
study of a data-mart consolidation in a global airline firm to discuss how to blend the 
technical aspects of valuing options with a strategy-focused approach. In this study, we build 
on previous research by applying the principles of option theory to study the impact of 
uncertainty on the value of information-based flexibility and the firm’s decision to centralize 
data management.  
Model Formulation 
In this section we set up the basic model and discuss the key assumptions. 
The Model 
Local business-unit information, I , is defined as a state of information on which probability 
assignments will be made [33]. The value of information is its option value, implying 0I , 
and that more information provides more possibilities for consideration. For example, a 
supermarket could collect information, I , about the types of product a customer purchases 
each week. The supermarket could decide to increase the amount of information collected 
about the customer by adding the precise time of day that the customer buys the product. The 
collection of such additional information increases costs but could help the supermarket 
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increase sales through more precise forecasting of the customer-buying pattern. We suppose 
that the firm consists of a central unit, CU, and several business units, BU. For ease of 
exposition, we initially examine the case of one central unit and one business unit, as this 
provides the main intuition. We add a second business unit when we examine the impact of 
economies of scope in information management across business units.  
Consider the case where there are two periods, t=0, and t=1. In period t=0, the firm 
makes a decision about how much information to collect. The return from this information 
collection is realized in period t=1. There are two possible states of nature in terms of 
external environment, )2,1( NN . The environmental outcome could be due to changes in 
tastes, as from a change in fashion, or to change in competition, as from entry or exit. The 
state of the external environment is revealed at t=1. At this point, the firm can react by 
collecting further business-unit information in order either to leverage an opportunity better, 
or to limit its losses.3 Local business-unit information can be collected via the central unit at 
cost CUC0  at time t=0. If this is done, upon learning the true state of the environment in period 
t=1, the center can collect new information at cost CUC1  to leverage the particular news. 
Alternatively, the business unit can collect the business-unit information in periods t=0 and 
t=1 at cost BUC0  and 
BUC1  respectively.  
If state 1  prevails (the probability of this is p), then the revenue (excluding the cost 
of information collection) is R . If 2  prevails (the probability of this is by definition (1-p)), 
then the loss is R . Let 1  be the favorable outcome where revenue is positive, 0R  and 
2  is the unfavorable outcome where losses are incurred and, hence, 0R . However, the 
firm will only continue to be in business if the expected total surplus of doing so is positive, 
0)1()(   RppRRE . When the firm collects business-unit information in period t=0, 
this decision allows it to collect further business-unit information in period t=1 when the 
uncertainty is resolved to enable it either to leverage an opportunity better or to limit its 
losses.  
Let )1,0(  be the extent to which the revenue or loss, R, can be altered strategically 
using the information, I . The favorable outcome, R , can be enhanced by a factor, )1(  . 
The unfavorable outcome, R , can be limited by a factor, )1(  . The revenue in favorable 
times, R , and losses in unfavorable times, R , can be viewed as the base revenue that can 
be enhanced or limited by factors )1(   and )1(   respectively. In this sense, )1(   and 
)1(   represent the additional benefit from information gained by the firm over and above 
the base revenue of the firm. For example, a firm should rationally plan for business of size 
E(R), but if R+ is realized the firm could hire additional staff, while if R  is realized it could 
cancel outstanding orders. Therefore, the factors )1(   and )1(   can be thought of as the 
additional benefit accruing to the firm as a result of the additional information, helping it to 
amplify revenues or mitigate losses.   
                                                 
3 Since there is uncertainty in the environment, it is not possible to fully contract on the type of data to be collected between 
the central unit and the business units ([4] and [35]). 
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The Assumptions 
We model the optimal decision rights of centralization/decentralization under low and high 
uncertainty respectively. We first consider the case of low uncertainty before going on to 
examine the case of high uncertainty. Our assumptions are listed in Table 1.  
Table 1. Assumptions 
No. Assumption 
1 )()( 1010
BUBUBUCUCUCU CCTCCCTC    
2 CUBU    )1()1( CUBU    )1()1( CUBU    
3 Total cost, )()()( 10 ICICITC  where 0)(' ITC  and 0)(" ITC  
4 Total revenue, )()()( 10 IRIRITR  where 0)(  IRT and 0)(  IRT  
5 Variance of W is: ),(2)()()( 22 YXabCovYVarbXVaraWVar   and 
),,()(*)( NIYXVWVarWVar  , 
where )()()(),( YEXEXYEYXCov   and aand b are constants. 
 
The interpretation of these assumptions is as follows:  
(i) Assumption (1) states that the total cost of collecting the business-unit information 
at the central unit, )( 10
CUCUCU CCTC  , is cheaper than collecting it at the 
business unit, )( 10
BUBUBU CCTC  , over both periods. This can be interpreted as 
a scale economy for the central unit without the benefit of local tailoring.4 For 
example, the benefit from scale economies for the central unit is due to savings 
from removing duplicated efforts of collecting the same information when each 
business unit collects its own information.5 Hence, the savings from centralizing 
the information collection is the difference in costs, 
)()( 1010
CUCUBUBU CCCCG  .  
(ii) Assumption (2) implies that the business unit can react more opportunistically 
than the central unit. Since local information is better tailored, we assume that the 
extent to which the revenue can be altered strategically using the information, I , 
will be greater if the business unit collects the information, than if the information 
is centralized at the central unit. This is because of environmental proximity: the 
business unit, being closer to the customer and competitors, is better able to judge 
the type of information required in period t=0, and can react better to 
environmental changes in period t=1. 
(iii) Assumption (3) states that the total cost of information collection and 
management is the sum of the costs for the two periods.6 The marginal total cost is 
                                                 
4 Environmental proximity might provide the business unit with some cost advantage over the central unit. However, we 
consider the case where the scale benefits for the central unit are large enough that the total cost for the central unit is 
lower than that for the business units. 
5 In addition to the factors outlined in (i), reasons in support of this assumption include the presence of more technology 
with lower utilization rates, more duplication, more people and more package purchases in a decentralized model [1]. 
6 We consider the data collection and maintenance costs. However, in an ongoing organization, firms usually already have in 
place existing information systems and databases. Hence, the firm needs to consider the additional set-up costs as a result 
of changes in the external environment. For example, this additional cost could be due to the cost of hardware for the 
database, database design and systems installation. Such one-off costs need to be added to the data-collection and 
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increasing with respect to information, twice differentiable and convex in 
information, I  [see 34]. This implies that the cost increases as more information is 
collected, and does so more than proportionately to the increase in information. 
(iv) Assumption (4) states that the total revenue is the sum of the revenues for the two 
periods. The marginal total revenue is increasing with respect to information, 
twice differentiable and concave in information, I. 7 This implies that the revenue 
increases as more information is collected, and does so less than proportionately 
to the increase in information.  
(v) Assumption (5) states that the dispersion of the possible states of the environment 
is encapsulated by the random variable, W . The random variable, W , is defined 
as bYaXW  , where a  and b  are constants ( X  and Y  are information signals 
drawn from business unit A and business unit B respectively). The variance of W  
is denoted by )(WVar  and )( *WVar  before and after incorporating the variance-
reducing effect of the new information respectively. We explain this assumption 
in more detail later in the section on centralizing under high and low uncertainty.  
We summarize the key notation used in the paper in Table 2. 
Table 2. Modelling Notation: Definition and Comment 
Notation Definition Comment 
R , R  R is revenue and R is loss.  Captures the base revenue and loss for the 
business units excluding the cost of 
information-collection. 
TC  Total cost of collecting information. Total cost consists of the sum of the costs for 
each of the two periods )( 10 CC  . 
)1(   Factor by which base revenue can be 
enhanced. 
Additional benefit from information over and 
above the base revenue. 
)1(   Factor by which base loss can be 
reduced. 
Additional benefit from information to limit the 
base loss. 
I  Level of business-unit information. Captures the level of investment in business-
unit information. 
1 , 2  Possible states of the world.  Captures the uncertainty in the environment. 
p and  
)1( p  
Probability that the favorable or 
unfavorable states of the world will 
occur. 
Based on the principle of information entropy, 
low uncertainty is when p  is close to either 0 
or 1, and high uncertainty is when p  is close to 
0.5 respectively.   
)(VE  Expected total surplus. Total expected total surplus is the surplus of the 
business units based on the information they 
have collected under the different levels of 
uncertainty. 
  Correlation coefficient between 
business-unit returns. 
Captures the level of similarities between the 
business units. 
 
Figure 1 provides a conceptual framework for the paper. We examine how low and high 
uncertainty (external to the firm) respectively, and the degree of similarity between business 
                                                                                                                                                        
maintenance costs above. In such a case, our main analysis and propositions will still hold but some of the conditions will 
be stricter for centralization to be optimal. 
7 This assumption is similar for a concave revenue function with reference to investment in input such as talent [see 5]. 
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units (internal to the firm), influence the decision to centralize or decentralize data 
management. Our approach compares the relative total surplus of the firm under 
centralization and decentralization in order to decide on the optimal structure.  
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
 
  
Centralization and Flexibility 
In this section we discuss the tension between efficiency and flexibility related to data 
centralization. The key insight from this section is that uncertainty and irreversibility give rise 
to option-based flexibility value and, hence, ignoring them could result in sub-optimal 
decisions. We analyze the decision about whether to centralize in order to see how the main 
sources of optionality, namely uncertainty and irreversibility, affect this decision. 
We define flexibility in terms of decision-making flexibility and its relation to how 
information is collected and managed in the organization [32]. In this sense, the flexibility of 
decision-making is greater the larger the choice-set under consideration or the more 
alternatives are available for a decision that, in turn, gives rise to more total surplus. To 
explore the tension more formally, let us examine the decision to centralize in the case where 
there is uncertainty.  
The Decision to Centralize 
The expected total surplus of centralization and decentralization can be denoted by )( CUVE  
and )( BUVE  respectively.8 We consider the case of both centralization and decentralization 
to show how the option value arises. In particular, we compare the total surplus of the firm 
under both centralization and decentralization in order to decide which structure creates more 
total surplus. Let us consider the case of centralization:  
                                                 
8 Following Ponssard [36, p. 740] the expected value of information should be denoted as )/( IVE CU , where 
)/( IVE CU is the incremental gain obtained by making a decision based on information, I. However, for simplicity we 
write )/( IVE CU as )(
CUVE . 
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CUCUCUCU TCRppRVE   )]1()1()1([)(       (1) 
BUBUBUBU TCRppRVE   )]1()1()1([)(      (2) 
Taking the difference in expected total surpluses between the center and the business unit and 
substituting for G gives: 
)()1()()()( CUBUBUCUBUCU RppRGVEVE       (3), 
where 
CUBU TCTCG  . 
The decision to centralize implies that the expected total surplus from centralization must be 
larger than the expected total surplus from decentralization, (i.e. (3) must be positive):9 
 0)()1()()()(  
CUBUBUCUBUCU RppRGVEVE   
Hence, in order for centralization to increase total surplus of the firm: 
])1()[(   RppRG
CUBU         (4) 
Inequality (4) implies that the savings from centralization, G, must be larger than the 
difference in the total surplus from information-based flexibility between the center and the 
business unit, in order for centralization to be beneficial. Hence, 
])1()[(   RppR
CUBU   (which is a positive value) translates into flexibility value, or 
the option value from decentralization. The value of such flexibility must be smaller than G 
for centralization to be worthwhile, given that it involves foreclosing the option. We show 
below that there could be an excess tendency to centralize if the firm were to ignore 
irreversibility and uncertainty. 
The Effect of Irreversibility and Uncertainty 
To see why this is the case, first consider the roles that irreversibility and uncertainty play in 
the decision to centralize. Irreversibility arises because the investment costs are usually sunk, 
in the sense that the costs of collecting and storing data cannot be retrieved when the 
environment changes [38]. 
 Irreversibility implies that the firm would not be able to collect information in period 
t=1 if it did not collect the relevant information in period t=0.10 Therefore, ignoring 
irreversibility implies that the firm myopically thinks that it will be able to leverage 
opportunities or limit losses just as effectively as when the relevant information at issue was 
collected by the central unit or the business unit (i.e. CUBU   , hence 
)1()1( BUCU   and )1()1( BUCU   ). Clearly, if it is cheaper to collect the 
information at the level of central unit than that of business unit, and the ability to react 
strategically is the same, then it makes sense for the firm to centralize data management at the 
central unit.  
                                                 
9 We could consider the weaker condition that (3) must be non-negative as there could be other non-specified options that 
arise around centralization efforts. However, for simplicity we consider the stricter case that (3) must be positive. 
10 For example, a grocer might be unable to gather consumer purchasing data having not previously invested in product 
barcode data. 
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Now consider the effect of ignoring uncertainty: the profit would be known for certain 
regardless of the type of information or where it is collected. Since there is no uncertainty, 
there is no opportunity to enhance the revenue or mitigate losses. As the returns are certain, 
the firm would be better off centralizing, as this is the cheaper structure for the firm. The 
effects of ignoring irreversibility and uncertainty are shown formally in Appendix 1. In 
summary, we show that the firm would have an excess tendency to centralize if it were to 
ignore irreversibility and uncertainty respectively. 
Empirical Illustrations  
Marchand et al. [30] distinguish between moderate competition and hypercompetitive 
environments in formulating a framework for data centralization. In moderately competitive 
environments, the demand pattern is stable and, hence, less emphasis is placed on 
uncertainty. In contrast, in hypercompetitive environments, the demand pattern changes 
continuously and, hence, the firm needs to place more emphasis on uncertainty in its data-
centralization decision. In moderately competitive markets, the focus on supply-chain 
management (e.g. production planning or inventory management systems) can bring 
substantial operational benefits. On the other hand, in a hypercompetitive environment, where 
the demand pattern is continually changing, the focus must be on managing customer 
interaction, account management, and order processing. In the latter environments, the 
emphasis shifts from supply-chain management, with detailed management reporting and 
controls, to demand-chain management by simplifying detailed management reporting, and 
empowering managers to act in response to the changing environment. As the competitive 
environment changes, the need for flexibility to serve customer requirements becomes more 
important than the need for centralized data management. In highly competitive 
environments, the data management is decentralized to the business units facing the 
environment in order to leverage the benefit from the total surplus from the information-
based flexibility. On the other hand, in less competitive environments the focus is on 
centralizing data management in order to reduce costs.  
       The case of a leading elevator company illustrates how firms manage the tension 
between centralizing and decentralizing data management while maintaining business 
flexibility [29]. The firm’s business focused on providing local services to customers in 22 
countries. This involved 22 local operations, which were managed centrally. Competitors 
were entering their markets with a more decentralized operating model, which was affecting 
the firm’s performance. The newly appointed CEO decided to divide the 22 country 
operations into 3 regions and to operate with a regional, rather than a country, focus. The 
business-information systems were also organized regionally, enabling the regional business 
units to react in a more agile manner to opportunities that arose, compared to the previous, 
more centralized, approach. In effect, decentralizing data management, by moving away from 
being driven by the center to the regions, enabled a fuller realization of the benefit from the 
value of information-based flexibility at the regional level. This allowed the elevator 
company to “leverage its reputation, deep business knowledge and human capabilities to 
target real sources of competitive differentiation locally in elevator markets and at the same 
time leverage regional and global expertise where it creates technological, product and 
operational advantages” [29]. The company achieved a better balance between business-unit 
flexibility and centralization of data management, which improved its operating performance. 
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Centralization under High and Low Uncertainty  
This section extends the above framework to analyze the decision to centralize data when 
there are cross-benefit effects across the different business units. In the next section we 
discuss a case where there are cross-benefit effects from similar business units when there is 
low uncertainty. We then go on to discuss the case when there is high uncertainty.  
Similarity of Business Units in the Presence of Low Uncertainty        
The key insight of this section is that under low uncertainty centralization becomes more 
attractive as the similarity of the business units increases. This is because coordination 
benefits are leveraged more fully while the benefit from diversity of information sources in 
reducing uncertainty is minimal.  
In this section we are concerned with low uncertainty. Based on the principle of 
information entropy [28][39], low uncertainty is when p  is close to either 0 or 1, where the 
firm becomes certain about the true state of the environment (equivalently, p and ( p1 ) are 
further away from 0.5). It follows that high uncertainty is when the firm is less certain about 
the true state of the environment and, hence, p and ( p1 ) are closer to 0.5. Consider two 
business units, A and B, denoted by ABU  and BBU . Part of business unit B’s profits is 
correlated with business unit A’s profits, and vice versa. The profit directly attributed to 
ABU  is 
AR  and 
AR , respectively, for the two states of the environment ( 1  and 2  with 
probabilities p  and )1( p  respectively). Similarly, the profits directly attributed to BBU  are 
BR  and 
BR , respectively, for the two states of the environment. However, there are cross-
benefit effects across the business units. Let X  and Y  be two random variables that are 
information signals drawn from business unit A and business unit B respectively about their 
client needs and the state of the environment. Let X  and Y  be drawn from 
distributions )(Xf and )(Yf respectively. The extent of the cross-benefit is captured by the 
correlation coefficient, )1,0( , where 
)()(
),(
YVarXVar
YXCov
 . The cross-benefit effect 
captures the level of similarity between the businesses.11  
Business units that are similar, for example, due to having similar customers or 
product lines, have a higher correlation coefficient due to higher cross-benefit effects. The 
sharing of a common customer often results in one business unit collecting information that is 
beneficial to another. For example, the payment history of a bank’s credit card customer 
might be helpful in assessing the same customer’s credit rating for a mortgage application, 
and vice versa. Business units that are similar have cross-benefit effect,   closer to 1. When 
business units are similar, with   closer to 1, the distributions )(Xf and )(Yf  are more 
homogeneous. This implies that the firm gets limited new information from the information 
signals X  and Y  due to the redundancy of the dependent sources [16]. In contrast, business 
units that are dissimilar have cross-benefit effects   closer to zero, and, hence, the 
distributions )(Xf  and )(Yf  are more heterogeneous. This implies that the firm gets most 
                                                 
11 We define the level of similarity with reference to the commonality of information requirements across the business units 
due to, for example, common customers or serving a common market segment. In this sense, business units that are more 
similar display a higher overlap in their information requirements in leveraging an opportunity or limiting a loss. 
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new information from the information signals X  and Y due to the high independence of the 
sources [17]. We discuss further the case when business units are dissimilar in the section on 
high uncertainty below.  
As a result of the cross-benefit effect, the profit of BBU  is given by 
AB RR    and 
AB RR   , where   is a correlation coefficient.
12 Similarly, the profit of ABU  has cross-
benefit effects from the profits of BBU , such that 
BA RR    and 
BA RR   . Hence, the 
business-unit information, I  for ABU  benefits BBU , and vice versa. Table 3 summarizes the 
returns.   
Table 3. Similarity of Business Units and Returns 
States of Nature )2,1( NN  Business Unit A, ABU  Business Unit B, BBU  
1  with probability p  
BA RR    
AB RR    
2  with probability )1( p  
BA RR    
AB RR    
 
In addition, the similarity of the business units also affects the cost advantage of 
centralization relative to decentralization of data management. This is because centralization 
removes duplicated efforts of collecting the same information, as noted in assumption (1). 
The higher the business unit similarity, the higher will be the cost advantage of centralization. 
We capture this through the relationship between total costs of the central unit and the 
business units respectively, ])[1( BACU TCTCTC   , where   is scale parameter, 
10    that captures the extent of cost advantage from centralization due to the degree of 
similarity of the business units. 
Impact of Low Uncertainty on the Decision to Centralize 
For simplicity, let us consider the case where BUBA   . This implies that the ability of 
both business units to leverage an opportunity and limit a loss with respect to the level of 
information is more or less the same. In order to decide whether to centralize or decentralize, 
we compare the expected total surplus of the firm with centralized and decentralized data 
management respectively. First, we examine the role of cross-benefit effects on coordination 
across business units. Second, we examine the role of diversity of information sources on 
new information generation and its influence on the degree of uncertainty. Without 
discounting, the expected total surplus of centralized and decentralized business units’ data 
collection can be denoted by )( CUVE  and )]()([
BA VEVE   respectively, where: 
CUBACUBACUCU TCRRpRRpVE   )])(1)(1())(1()[1()(    (5) 
and: 
                                                 
12 There could be some cases of negative correlation when business units act as a hedge, whereby increase in revenue for 
one business implies a decrease in revenues for another business. We do not consider these in our analysis.  
 16 
][
][)])(1)(1())(1([)]()([
BA
BABACUBCUBA
TCTC
KKRRpRRpVEVE

  
 (6) 
where: 
A
BBUBBUABUABUA
TC
RpRpRpRpVE

  ])1)(1()1([)1)(1()1()( 
 
(6a) 
B
ABUABUBBUBBUB
TC
RpRpRpRpVE

  ])1(1)(1()1([)1)(1()1()( 
   
(6b)
 
and:  
])1)(1()1([ BBUBBUB RpRp     and: 
])1)(1()1([ ABUABUA RpRp    . 
The individual business units A and B maximize the expected total surplus )( AVE  and 
)( BVE by taking surpluses 
B and 
A  as given respectively, as they do not have influence 
over the decision about how much to invest in the information of the other business unit. This 
implies that because individual business units are optimizing their own profit, they do not 
factor in the cross-benefit effects of their own decisions on other business units.13 On the 
other hand, the central unit is able to factor in the cross-benefit effects and, hence, maximizes 
the total (joint) surplus subject to such cross-benefit effects. Let the optimized investment 
level for the central units and business units A and B be ),(
**
BA CUCU II  and ),(
**
BA BUBU II  
respectively.  
       In order to decide whether to centralize or decentralize, we compare the total surplus of 
the firm under both conditions. Taking the difference in expected total surpluses between CU 
and BU gives (double star denotes optimized value for CU and single star for BU 
respectively): 
])[(]][)])(1)(1())(1([[
)])(1)(1())(1()[1()]()([)(
**********
********
CUBABABABUBABU
BACUBACUBACU
TCTCTCKKRRpRRp
RRpRRpVEVEVE






 (7) 
The decision to centralize implies that the expected total surplus from centralizing must be 
larger than the expected total surplus from decentralizing (i.e. (7) must be positive): 
0])[(]][)])(1)(1())(1([[
)])(1)(1())(1()[1(
**********
********




CUBABABABUBABU
BAUBACU
TCTCTCKKRRpRRp
RRpRRp

 B
.
 
This requires: 
                                                 
13 An alternative specification might include a parameter that captures the extent to which a business unit is biased towards 
its own division in relation to the other division [2]. However, for simplicity we assume that such a bias does not exist and 
the business division optimizes its own surplus. 
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]][)])(1)(1())(1([[
)])(1)(1())(1()[1(])[(
******
************
BABABUBABU
BACUBACUCUBA
KKRRpRRp
RRpRRpTCTCTC






 
In Appendix 2 we show that when businesses face a low uncertainty environment, 
higher similarity between the business units calls for more centralization. Moreover, higher 
similarity between business units implies higher correlated information signals X  and Y  
respectively, due to the distributions )(Xf and )(Yf  being more homogeneous. Hence, this 
implies that the firm gets limited new information from information signals X  and Y . In 
addition, since the degree of uncertainty is already low, any new information does not help in 
reducing the degree of uncertainty further. Moreover, since correlated signals do not reduce 
information variance of the random variable, W  (denoted by 
),(2)()()( 22 YXabCovYVarbXVaraWVar  , as noted in assumption (5) of Table 1), and 
the degree of uncertainty is already low, there is limited value from decentralization to 
benefit further from improved flexibility. Therefore, we posit the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1 (Low Uncertainty and Business-Unit Similarity Proposition)  
In the presence of low uncertainty, centralization contributes to a higher increase in total 
surplus for the firm compared to decentralization as the similarity of the business units 
increases (i.e.   increases) and: 
(i) does so at the same rate as the advantage of the business units relative to the 
central unit in their ability to react to information increases (i.e. the larger is 
)(
CU
BU


   ); 
(ii) does so at a higher rate as the cost of the central unit relative to the business 
unit decreases (i.e. the larger is  , the cost advantage of centralization over 
decentralization). 
Proposition 1 implies that centralization enables similar businesses to benefit from each 
other’s decision to collect information. However, if business units are allowed to act 
independently, there is a risk of increased costs from duplication of the information collected 
by each business unit, as well as the opportunity cost of not being able to coordinate actions 
to maximize the total surplus of the firm. Therefore, the Uncertainty and Business Unit 
Similarity Proposition (P1) implies that the benefits from centralization are larger when 
businesses are similar, as the center is better able to internalize the cross-benefit effects 
between the business units. The more similar the business units’ information requirements, 
the higher the cross-benefit will be between them, resulting in a larger total surplus for the 
firm from centralization. Moreover, the proportionate increase in total surplus from 
centralization over decentralization as the business-unit similarity increases remains the same 
as the advantage of the business from local tailoring becomes stronger. In addition, 
Proposition 1 states that the cross-benefit and cost advantage realized through centralization 
of decision-making become even stronger as the center’s cost advantage from less duplication 
becomes stronger. A direct corollary of Proposition 1 is that the lower the similarity between 
business units, the lower the cross-benefit between businesses and, hence, the lower the 
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benefits from centralization.14 Therefore, the corollary implies that as the business units 
become more dissimilar, decentralizing data management becomes optimal. 
Empirical Illustrations 
The case of Wal-Mart provides an illustrative example of a business with similar stores 
across the country, allowing for data to be managed centrally. When Wal-Mart analyzed its 
centralized shopper history data after Hurricane Charlie hit Florida in August 2004, it found 
that, somewhat surprisingly, people tended to buy strawberry pop tarts and beer in Wal-Mart 
stores that were in the eye of the hurricane just before the storm hit [41]. Acting on this 
information, Wal-Mart filled its trucks with toaster pastries and six-packs and stocked its 
other Florida stores with similar buyer profiles that were in the pathway of Hurricane Frances 
a few weeks later in September 2004. Most of the stock was sold before the second hurricane. 
Wal-Mart was able to benefit because of two factors. First, by centralizing its data 
management, Wal-Mart was able to share information across stores because of the similarity 
of buying patterns across some of its Florida stores. Second, it was able to eliminate 
duplication of information on its supplier side by capturing information about customer 
purchases centrally. Such customer-purchase information reduces costs by consolidating the 
delivery of the product categories in demand to stores ahead of the hurricane and reducing 
other product categories.        
On the other hand, when business units become more dissimilar, they prefer to have 
more independent control of business-unit information because choices made by the 
corporate center diverge from local business-unit needs. For example, within a 
pharmaceutical firm, a division that competes on cost, based on delivering commodity 
products such as intravenous fluid bags or other supplies, takes an approach to data 
management that is different from the approach taken by another division that focuses on 
research and development with a high-margin business [5]. The commodity-based product 
division will be concerned with information related to managing the manufacturing and 
divisional operating costs, while the R&D development division needs to track and manage 
information about new ideas and discoveries that help its scientists’ research efforts. Any 
attempt to centralize data management of these dissimilar divisions is likely to compromise 
one or both business units’ objectives. As discussed earlier, this is because the firm will not 
benefit as much from centralizing data management due to dissimilar businesses, while 
reducing the ability of the business units to leverage their respective total surplus from 
information-based flexibility. 
       In summary, under low uncertainty firms need to be cognizant of the level of similarity 
across business units when deciding whether to centralize data across the firm. Next we look 
at how this decision is affected in the case of high uncertainty. 
Similarity of Business Units in the Presence of High Uncertainty 
We now analyze the impact of high uncertainty on the decision to centralize data 
management. The key insight of this section is that centralization can become more attractive 
                                                 
14 We defined similarity of the business in terms of common customer or market segment being served. However, although 
the business units could be serving different customer segments, they might still be jointly affected by co-integrated 
exogenous factors such as the state of the economy. We do not model this aspect of the similarity between the business 
units. 
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as the dissimilarity of the business units increases. This is because dissimilar businesses 
enable the firm to reduce uncertainty, which in turn enhances the value of cross-benefit 
effects and hence, increases the surplus for the centre more than for the business units.  
High uncertainty means the firm is less certain about the true state of the environment 
[28][39]. Hence, high uncertainty implies that there is higher variance in the possible 
outcomes. However, business units that are dissimilar enable the firm to get new information 
about the state of the environment by combining information from diverse sources. We next 
formalize how the reduction in uncertainty influences the decision to centralize data 
management.  
Impact of the Similarity of Business Units 
One approach to reducing high uncertainty is to compare information across business units. 
Similarity of business units implies commonality in terms of information requirements in 
order to benefit from opportunities arising from existing businesses. The low uncertainty 
environment arises from relatively known events, such as the probability of whether or not 
the customer is likely to purchase the product. For example, this could be the case with the 
mortgage and credit divisions of a bank that might share the same potential customer. 
However, in a highly uncertain environment, the uncertainty arises from macro changes, such 
as new technological breakthroughs. Such a highly uncertain environment often calls for 
diversity in the types of information required in order to reduce the high uncertainty and 
leverage opportunities. For example, the uncertainty could be about changes in customer 
preferences as a result of a new technology, such as mobile technology, on retail banking. 
Such uncertainty calls for diverse information about mobile technology and payment systems 
to reduce the high level of uncertainty.  
Therefore, when there is high uncertainty, the possibilities to reduce the variance of 
outcomes are increased, by comparing information between business units that are dissimilar 
relative to business units that are similar. Various sources of research support this assertion. 
First, studies show that organizations combine diverse data to reduce ambiguity or high 
uncertainty in equivocal contexts [see 18]. Second, Clemen and Winkler [16] show that when 
information sources are dependent, the resulting information from these sources will be 
redundant. Therefore, the reduction in variance or gain in precision afforded by dependent 
information sources will be less than that from independent sources. Third, the benefit of 
combining dissimilar information is supported by research that shows that creative solutions 
to a problem are more likely to come from diverse sources [22, 24]. As discussed earlier, 
when business unit A and business unit B are dissimilar, the distribution from which 
information signals X  and Y  are drawn, )(Xf and )(Yf  respectively, is more 
heterogeneous. Such heterogeneous distribution implies diversity and, therefore, the 
combination of signals X  and Y  provides new information. Hence, we assume that in this 
context, when business units are more dissimilar, 0   YX creates more new 
information, NI , which helps reduce the variance of the possible states of the environment. 
Impact of High Uncertainty on the Decision to Centralize 
To incorporate the situation of high uncertainty into our model, we consider the case where 
the firm is less certain about the true state of the environment and, hence, p  and ( p1 ) are 
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closer to 0.5. Such a dispersion of the possible states of the environment is encapsulated by 
the random variable, W , with corresponding distribution, )(Wf , as per assumption (5). 
Therefore, the expected total surplus of W  is )()()( YbEXaEWE  . The variance of W , 
denoted by ),(2)()()( 22 YXabCovYVarbXVaraWVar  , is as noted in assumption (5) of 
Table 1. When the business units are more dissimilar, namely 0 , then Cov(X,Y)  0, 
which helps reduce the variance of the possible states of the environment. An improvement in 
information signals reduces the variance of W  to *)(WVar , where 
),,()(*)( NIYXVWVarWVar  , as noted in assumption (5) of Table 1. We capture the 
effect of the new information in reducing uncertainty via a reduction in variance through the 
term ),,( NIYXV [3]. Therefore, the term ),,( NIYXV  can be interpreted as the gain in 
precision from the new information, NI  [17]. Intuitively, this says that the new information 
reduces uncertainty in the random variable, W , due to the combined information provided by 
information signals X and Y  jointly. Such a gain in precision due to the new information in 
turn reduces uncertainty by moving p  and ( p1 ) away from 0.5 to either 0 or 1. Hence, the 
gain in precision from the new information makes the outcome more certain for the firm.  
In order to decide whether to centralize or decentralize, we compare the expected total 
surplus of the firm with centralized and decentralized models respectively. As 0 , the 
business units become most dissimilar and hence, the information signals X and Y  become 
more independent. Therefore, the high degree of uncertainty is reduced more as business 
units become more dissimilar compared to when they are similar. In order to decide how such 
a reduction in uncertainty affects the decision to centralize or decentralize data management, 
we revisit the decision criteria as provided by inequality (7): 
]][)])(1)(1())(1([[
)])(1)(1())(1()[1(])[(
BABABUBABU
BACUBACUCUBA
KKRRpRRp
RRpRRpTCTCTC






 
Recollect that when the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side, the firm needs to 
centralize. We examine the role of diversity of information sources on new information 
generation and its influence on the degree of uncertainty. In order to do so, we examine the 
strength of the cross-benefit effect on coordination across business units relative to the 
benefit of local tailoring.  
A reduction in uncertainty causes an interaction between the coordination benefit 
accruing to the central unit and the local tailoring benefit accruing to the business units. As 
discussed earlier, the reduction in high uncertainty is higher when the business units are more 
dissimilar compared to when they are similar. When dissimilarity is high, the probability of 
an event occurring changes from 5.0p  to a higher value if the favorable outcome is more 
likely, or to a lower value if an unfavorable outcome is more likely. The case when the 
unfavorable outcome becomes more likely implies that the firm is less likely to continue in 
the business because the returns are less attractive and might fall below the minimum 
threshold. Therefore, we examine the decision to centralize or decentralize data management 
when the reduction in uncertainty makes the favorable outcome more likely.  
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We are interested primarily in how the decision about whether to centralize or 
decentralize data management varies as we change the parameter values. Therefore, we need 
to compare how the relative surplus between centralization and decentralization changes 
when the business units are dissimilar compared to when they are more similar. We conduct 
numerical analysis in Appendix 3 in order to do this. In particular we examine the decision to 
centralize or decentralize due to the similarity of the business units, and examine how such an 
effect changes as we change the relative advantage of the business units to the central unit in 
their ability to react to information and the relative cost advantage of the central unit to the 
business units. 
The numerical analysis shows that as the business units become more dissimilar, the 
change in probability towards the more favorable outcome implies that more weight is placed 
on the favorable outcome compared to the unfavorable outcome. However, the increased 
weight placed on the favorable outcome means the coordination benefit becomes stronger, 
which favors centralization. On the other hand, the positive weight placed on the favorable 
outcome means the benefit of local tailoring is also correspondingly higher, which favors 
decentralization. The numerical analysis shows that when business-unit dissimilarity 
increases, the larger reduction in uncertainty influences the cross-benefit effect from 
coordination more than the benefit from local tailoring. This means that as the business units 
become more dissimilar, centralization becomes more favorable compared to 
decentralization. The analysis also shows that such an effect becomes stronger as the 
advantage of the business unit relative to the central unit in their abilities to react to 
information increases. In contrast, the incentive to centralize remains the same when the cost 
of the central unit relative to the business unit decreases. The corollary of this result is that as 
the dissimilarity of the business units increases, centralization becomes less attractive and, 
hence, increasingly favors decentralization. Therefore, we posit the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2 (High Uncertainty and Business-Unit Dissimilarity Proposition) 
In the presence of high uncertainty, centralization contributes to a higher increase in total 
surplus for the firm compared to decentralization as the dissimilarity of the business units 
increases (i.e.   decreases) and: 
(i) does so at a higher rate as the advantage of the business units relative to the 
central unit in their ability to react to information increases (i.e. the larger 
is
CU
BU


  ); 
(ii) does so at the same rate as the cost of the central unit relative to the business 
unit decreases (i.e. the larger is  , the cost advantage of centralization over 
decentralization). 
Therefore, the High Uncertainty and Business-Unit Dissimilarity Proposition (P2) implies 
that the benefits from centralization could be larger when businesses are more dissimilar. 
This is because dissimilar businesses enable the generation of new information in order to 
reduce high uncertainty. Such a reduction in high uncertainty increases the benefit of 
coordination more than the corresponding benefit from local tailoring, which in turn makes 
centralization optimal. Such a reduction in uncertainty makes the cross-benefit and cost 
advantage realized through the centralization of decision-making even stronger as the 
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advantage of the business unit from local tailoring becomes stronger. In contrast, such a 
reduction in uncertainty makes the cross-benefit and cost advantage realized through the 
centralization of decision-making change proportionally as the center’s cost advantage from 
less duplication becomes stronger. A direct corollary of Proposition 2 is that the higher the 
similarity between the business units, the lower the reduction in uncertainty and, hence, the 
lower the benefits from centralization. Therefore, the corollary implies that as the business 
units become more similar, decentralizing data management becomes more optimal. 
Empirical Illustrations 
An illustrative example of this is the pharmacovigilance activities of a pharmaceutical 
company [37]. Pharmacovigilance activities include the systematic detection, assessment, 
understanding and prevention of adverse drug reactions. A major problem that 
pharmaceutical companies face in the pharmacovigilance area is the possibility that a drug 
might be taken by a patient in a manner for which it was not intended or clinically tested. 
This might arise due to the biological differences between the patient and the participants in 
the clinical trial, the combination of medicines taken with other therapies, or the medicine 
being prescribed for an indication that is different from the one that the medicine was 
approved for. These factors increase the odds of adverse effects that might not be detected at 
the clinical stage but could manifest after the launch of the medicine. For example, the US 
Food and Drug Administration shows an average growth rate of 12 per cent annually in 
adverse events reported between 1995 and 2004.  
Pharmaceutical firms face an ambiguous situation regarding the possibility of adverse 
events. High uncertainty is due to the complex combination of factors outlined above 
between product lines across various regulatory jurisdictions. As a result, the need to 
accommodate regulatory requirements or cultural imperatives calls for centralized data 
management. Moreover, much data is often collected and analyzed by discrete business units 
that have different therapy or compound-specific working groups using different collection 
approaches with broad data needs. Therefore, centralizing data management across the 
different business units enables data-sharing for more efficient patient safety, consistent 
regulatory compliance, and controlled risk management, while enabling scale by 
systematically following a set of procedures. For example, clinical trial data might not be 
leveraged for use for patient-safety purposes because they were not collected with future 
purposes in mind. In such cases, centralizing data management allows for a more coordinated 
use across departments to identify safety trends, resulting in reduced uncertainty and, 
consequently, lower adverse consequences. Therefore, in the case of high uncertainty, 
centralized data management allows for the benefits of managing overall risk, which enables 
data-sharing to narrow the possible outcomes and, hence, benefit from the value of flexibility 
simultaneously. In summary, high uncertainty situations might call for more centralized data 
management in the case of dissimilar business units in order to control broad risks and enable 
a reduction in the level of uncertainty through information-sharing.  
Discussion and Managerial Implications 
Our research develops a framework to help firms to decide more accurately when it is 
optimal to centralize data by considering the value of information-based flexibility in the 
presence of uncertainty. We show that firms need to consider not only costs but also the value 
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of information-based flexibility in evaluating the benefits of centralizing data management. 
We first consider the case of low uncertainty and then we go on to discuss the case of high 
uncertainty. In doing so, we show that, in the presence of low uncertainty, centralization 
creates more total surplus as the similarity of the business units increases. In contrast, in the 
presence of high uncertainty, centralization creates more total surplus as the dissimilarity 
between business units increases when new information reduces the high uncertainty and in 
turn enhances the surplus from coordination relative to the surplus of the superior ability of 
the business units to react to uncertainty. 
Framework for Summarizing Recommendations        
The two main considerations for firms to take into account in deciding between centralization 
and decentralization are uncertainty (external to the firm) and the extent to which businesses 
are similar (internal to the firm). First, the level of uncertainty determines the value of 
flexibility from an unknown future state. Second, the level of similarity determines to what 
extent businesses can share useful information to increase joint flexibility value.  
Figure 2. Summary Recommendations 
  
  
Figure 2 helps to provide a cohesive summary of recommendations. The vertical axis 
measures the level of uncertainty and the horizontal axis measures the degree to which the 
businesses are dissimilar. First, we consider the case of low uncertainty, which is displayed in 
the bottom two rows of Figure 2. The two alternatives are as follows: 
(i) Case (1) with low uncertainty and similar businesses implies that centralization creates 
more total surplus than decentralization, as prescribed by Proposition 1. The benefits of 
decentralization in order to leverage information-based flexibility due to improved local 
tailoring would be minimal compared to the loss of coordination benefit because of the 
similarity of the business units and the low level of uncertainty.  
(ii) Case (2) with low uncertainty and dissimilar businesses implies that decentralization 
creates more total surplus than centralization, as prescribed by the corollary implied by 
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Proposition 1. The benefits from centralization due to better coordination are low because 
the business units are dissimilar and there is a low level of uncertainty.  
Second, we consider the case of high uncertainty. High uncertainty calls for the sharing of 
data to create new information and, hence, reduce the level of uncertainty. The top row of 
Figure 2 discusses the case of high uncertainty. The two alternatives are as follows: 
(i) Case (3) with high uncertainty and dissimilar businesses implies that centralization could 
create more total surplus than decentralization, as prescribed by Proposition 2. 
Centralization becomes more attractive when the reduction in high uncertainty due to 
dissimilar businesses (because of the new information) for the central unit increases the 
benefit from coordination more than the benefit from local tailoring for the business units. 
In such cases, the benefit from decentralization would be minimal because the reduction 
in uncertainty is less responsive to the total surplus of business unit’s ability to benefit 
from local tailoring than the benefit from central coordination.  
(ii) Case (4) with high uncertainty and similar businesses implies that decentralization creates 
more total surplus than centralization, as prescribed by the corollary implied by 
Proposition 2. This is because high uncertainty benefits the business units more than the 
central unit due to a relatively higher degree of information-based flexibility value due to 
improved local tailoring. The benefit from centralization as a result of new information 
reducing uncertainty is low because of the similar nature of the business units.  
Application of Framework to the Thomson Reuters Case        
The challenges faced by Thomson Reuters, as discussed in the Introduction, provide an 
illustrative example of this framework. In the 1980s and the 90s, Thomson Reuters had a very 
decentralized model in order to cater for each country’s specific needs. Thomson Reuters’ 
management thought that they were operating in quadrant (2) with dissimilar businesses, low 
benefits of central coordination, and an uncertain country-specific customer demand. 
However, with the decentralized data-management approach, due to the plethora of products, 
Thomson Reuters found it incredibly difficult to serve its large global clients when the rate of 
innovation in the financial markets increased in the late 1990s. This led to a period of 
centralized data management between early 2000 and 2005, with the introduction of a ‘Fast 
Forward’ programme. The business transformation programme centralized data management 
by transforming the product architecture from being organized around geography to customer 
groupings. In addition, the programme consolidated the client base in order to focus on a 
smaller set of key clients. In effect, Thomson Reuters’ management realized that they were in 
quadrant (1), where coordination across customer grouping was key to managing the velocity 
of change in the financial markets. The ‘Fast Forward’ programme streamlined the product 
portfolio to enable the center to coordinate better between business units. 
However, the rapid innovation in financial instruments, coupled with rapid changes in 
technology in the late 1990s and the new millennium (2000–9), reduced the competitive 
advantage of Thomson Reuters considerably. In particular, the pervasiveness of the Internet 
challenged the value of the private network, the Integrated Data Network built by Thomson 
Reuters to relay information. Moreover, the adoption of Internet technology provided the 
impetus for a rapid shift in industry borders and created a highly uncertain environment for 
Thomson Reuters. These developments meant that Thomson Reuters found it hard to keep 
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pace with such rapid change in order to identify information, disseminate it and respond to 
opportunities or threats. Continued market evolution thus caused Thomson Reuters to face 
significant uncertainty in the development of its markets and the ability to respond with 
appropriate products and services. Therefore, Thomson Reuters’ management realized it was 
in quadrants (3)–(4) and needed to strike a balance between centralized and decentralized 
data management in order to reduce high uncertainty depending on the degree of similarity of 
its business units.  
Reuters Group’s strength lay in the broker–dealer bank (the ‘sell-side’) market, while the 
Thomson Corporation’s strength lay in a different market, namely the investor market (the 
‘buy-side’), such as asset-management firms. The merger of the two groups to form Thomson 
Reuters in 2008 provided an opportunity to combine the different business units to reduce the 
high degree of uncertainty. In order to grow through innovation in such a dynamic market 
place, Thomson Reuters recognizes that it needs to move away from product-centric thinking 
to a model based on platform innovation where there is collaboration across its business 
units. This is because Thomson Reuters’ product-centric business model was perceived to be 
slow in identifying information, disseminating it and responding to an opportunity.   
The collaborative model calls for a more coordinated approach to information-gathering, 
dissemination and response. This coordinated approach implies greater collaboration with a 
common platform architecture and frequent data-sharing across its businesses in order to 
reduce high uncertainty and increase innovative activity. In order to facilitate such 
collaboration, Thomson Reuters is centralizing its platform-based data management to enable 
interactions among multiple business units, customers and suppliers. Therefore, Thomson 
Reuters recognizes it is operating in quadrant (3), where there are dissimilar business units 
combined with high uncertainty. Hence, Thomson Reuters is beginning to embrace a more 
collaborative innovation business model by building a common platform architecture across 
the sell-side and buy-side business units with centralized data management. On the other 
hand, where the business units are relatively similar, the benefits of centralized data 
management are reduced in a high-uncertainty environment and, hence, Thomson Reuters is 
embracing a more decentralized data-management model, as prescribed in quadrant (4).  
Conclusion 
The results derived in this paper provide a framework for how managers can decide on when 
it is optimal to centralize decisions about data management in the presence of low and high 
uncertainty. In particular, we show how there is a positive relationship between business-unit 
similarity and centralization under low uncertainty and how this relationship could be 
reversed in the case of high uncertainty. 
We recognize certain limitations of this study, which warrant further research. First, 
we do not consider the impact of standards on the decision to centralize or decentralize data 
management. A central assumption in much of the literature is that there is an association 
between centralization and standardization [1] [6] [25]. Standardization is the adoption of 
voluntary formal rules or procedures that pertain to a set of stakeholders [14].  
Standardization would enable better communication between business units or with the center 
[7]. An extension of our model could incorporate how data standards could influence the 
decision to centralize or decentralize data management. Second, we assume that the 
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correlation coefficient is positive between the business units. However, in the case where 
business units act as a hedge, whereby an increase in revenue for one business implies a 
decrease in revenues for another business, the correlation coefficient could be negative. An 
extension of the paper could analyze how the results would change in this case.  
Acknowledging these limitations, we argue that our model provides a useful framework 
for modelling the important decisions about centralizing data management. We show how the 
decision to centralize data management in the context of uncertainty in the environment has 
implications for the design of business models of firms and, hence, their innovative 
capabilities.  
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Appendix 1. Irreversibility and Uncertainty 
Irreversibility implies that in period t=1 the business-unit information can be collected just as 
efficiently, so that there is no difference in the impact on total surplus. If decisions are 
reversible, then CUBU    and, hence, )1()1( CUBU    and )1()1(
CUBU   . 
This implies that (3) becomes: GVEVE BUCU  )()(     (1A) 
Since G>0, (3) has a positive value, the optimal decision is to centralize data management.  
If the firm ignored uncertainty then the optimal decision would be such that the 
stochastic net profit problem becomes deterministic. If the expected total surplus (excluding 
costs) were believed to be known with certainty to be  , then 
0)1()1()1( 21 
iii RppR  , where ),( BUCUi . Effectively this means there is 
no opportunity to enhance the surplus or reduce losses as there is no uncertainty. This implies 
that (3) becomes: )()()( BUCUBUCU GVEVE       (1B) 
Since G  is a positive amount and 
BUCU   , (1B) has a positive value; therefore, the 
optimal decision is to centralize data management.  
 
Appendix 2. Low Uncertainty 
For both ABU  and BBU , the expected total surplus, as before, is:
15 
A
BBUBBUABUABUA
TC
RpRpRpRpVE

  ])1)(1()1([)1)(1()1()( 
  
(2A)            
B
ABUABUBBUBBUB
TC
RpRpRpRpVE

  ])1)(1()1([)1)(1()1()( 
(2B) 
])1)(1()1([ BBUBBUB RpRp     and ])1)(1()1([
ABUABUA RpRp     
Under decentralization, since each business unit treats 
B  and 
A  as fixed, the first-order 
conditions for ABU  and BBU  are respectively: 
0)1)(1()1()(  
AABUABUA CTRpRpVE       (2C) 
0)1)(1()1()(  
BBBUBBUB CTRpRpVE      (2D) 
This implies: 
AABUABU CTRpRp   )1)(1()1(        (2E) 
BBBUBBU CTRpRp   )1)(1()1(        (2F) 
Under centralization, the expected total surplus from (5) is: 
CUBACUBACUCU TCRRpRRpVE   )])(1)(1())(1()[1()(   (2G) 
The first-order condition for the central unit is: 
0)])(1)(1())(1()[1()(  
C UBAC UBAC UC U CTRRpRRpVE  (2H) 
This implies: 
                                                 
15 Revenues and loss (  RR , ), as well as costs (TC ), are functions of I . However, for simplicity we list them without 
reference to I .  
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CUBACUBACU CTRRpRRp   )])(1)(1())(1()[1(    (2I) 
One of the major differences between the central unit making the decision and the business 
units making the decision can be understood from examining the first condition in (2I) 
compared to (2E) and (2F). When the central unit makes the decision, it factors in the cross-
benefit accruing to each business unit as a result of the information-collection decision made 
by the other unit, which is captured by the correlation coefficient in the first-order condition 
in (2I). However, when the business units make the decision, although it affects overall 
surplus, as noted in equations (6a) and (6b), each business unit is optimizing its own surplus 
without considering the cross-benefit effects (because it is unable to influence the decision of 
the other business unit), as can be observed by the absence of the correlation term in first-
order conditions (2E) and (2F). 
We had established that for centralization to be optimal, the net total surplus, as defined by 
(7), must be positive,16
 
0)]()([)(  BACU VEVEVE ,
 
which implies: 
)][(]][)])(1)(1())(1([[
)])(1)(1())(1()[1(
BABABABUBABU
CUBACUBACU
TCTCKKRRpRRp
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. Let the optimal information for 
CU and business units A and B respectively be:  
),(
**
BA CUCU II  and ),(
**
BA BUBU II ,
  
which are the solutions for (2I), (2E) and (2F) respectively. In 
order to explore the comparative static of how the total surplus under centralization and 
decentralization changes as the values of the different parameters vary, we need to specify 
functional forms for the revenue and cost. Based on the assumptions in Table 1 and the 
associated discussion, we assume the following convex cost and concave revenue functional 
forms: 
Business unit cost, 
2
2
1
ITCTC BA          (2K) 
Therefore, ITCTC BA  ''  
Revenue, 2
1
10IRR BA           (2L) 
Therefore, 2
1
'' 5

  IRR
BA  
and the loss is defined as a negative proportion of revenues. 
Loss, 2
1
10IRR BA   , where 10        (2M) 
Therefore, 2
1
'' 5

  IRR
BA  
As discussed earlier, the total cost for the central unit is related to the business units’ costs, 
])[1( BACU TCTCTC   , where 10         (2N) 
                                                 
16 Alternatively we can compare the ratio of the total surplus for centralization relative to the total surplus for 
decentralization, which needs to be larger than one for centralization to be optimal. We perform such an analysis in the 
numerical section below. 
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and   captures the rate of cost reduction for the central unit due to savings from 
duplications. 
For business unit A, replace (2K) to (2M) into (2E) for the optimal information-collection:17 
3
2
)]1)(1)(5()1(5[
*
AABU ppI A          (2P) 
Similarly for business unit B from (2F), 
3
2
)]1)(1)(5()1(5[
*
BBBU ppI B         (2Q) 
For the central unit, replace (2K) to (2N) into (2I) for the optimal information-collection: 
3
2
]
)1(
)]1)(1(5)1(5)[1(
[
*





CUCU
CU ppI      (2R) 
We provide numerical solutions to compare how the total surplus under centralization and 
decentralization vary in order to examine how (i) the similarity of the business units,  ;  (ii) 
the advantage of the business unit relative to the central unit, 
CU
BU


  ; and (iii) the cost 
advantage of the central unit relative to the business units,  , influences the decision to 
centralize or decentralize data management. Since the firm only operates in the business 
when the expected value of doing so is positive, we consider the low uncertainty case when 
the probability of the favorable outcome, p , is close to 1.18 The surplus from 
decentralization can be computed by replacing the values from (2P) and (2Q) into surplus of 
business unit A, (2A) and surplus of business unit B, (2B) respectively. The surplus for the 
firm from decentralization comes from the sum of the surpluses of business units A and B 
respectively. The surplus from centralization can be computed by replacing the value from 
(2R) into the surplus of the central unit, (2G). In order to examine how the similarity of the 
business units affects the total surplus when the central unit makes the decision, compared to 
when the business units make the decision, we compare the benefit from centralization when 
business-unit similarity is low,19 L , to when it is high, H . We do so by comparing the ratio 
of the total surplus from centralization and decentralization (i) when business-unit similarity 
is low, L , with (ii) when business-unit similarity is high, H . Table 4 reports this ratio for 
different parameter values. The region of interest for Table 4 does pass the Hessian test for 
optimization. 
 
                                                 
17 The central unit’s optimal level of information collection ( ),
**
BA CUCU II  is obtained through the solution for 
*CUI . The 
numerical analysis shows that (i) the total collection of information by the central unit could be higher or lower than the 
business units, depending on the parameter values; and (ii) the total surplus for the central unit could be higher or lower 
than the business units, depending on the parameter values. 
18 The low uncertainty case where the probability of the unfavorable outcome is high, p is close to 0, implies that the 
expected total surplus is negative and, hence, the firm is unlikely to continue investing in the business. Although we 
analyze the case where the probability of the favorable outcome is high, it is straightforward to examine the case where 
low uncertainty implies the unfavorable outcome is high. The basic result of Proposition 1 would not change. 
19 Since the degree of uncertainty is low, any new information from dissimilar businesses (low  ) reducing the degree of 
uncertainty is negligible. 
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Table 4. Ratio of Expected Total Surplus from Centralization and Decentralization  
( )5.0,8.0,9.0  CUp   
No. Parameter 
values when 
business-unit 
similarity is low 
][ LL
L
BA
C
EVEV
EV



 when 
business-unit similarity is 
low 
Parameter 
values 
when 
business-
unit 
similarity is 
high 
][ HH
H
BA
C
EVEV
EV



 when 
business-unit similarity is 
high 
1 L 0.4; 

CU
BU


1.1; 
 0.3 
0.97 H 0.6; 

CU
BU


1.1; 
 0.3 
1.06 
 
2 L 0.4; 

CU
BU


1.2; 
 0.3 
0.96 H 0.6; 

CU
BU


1.2; 
 0.3 
1.05  
 
3 L 0.3; 

CU
BU


1.1; 
 0.4 
0.98 H 0.6; 

CU
BU


1.1; 
 0.4 
1.09  
 
 
 Table 4 shows how the ratio of the expected total surplus from centralization over the 
expected value from decentralization varies when business-unit similarity is low compared to 
when it is high. When the ratio is larger than one, centralization creates more value than 
decentralization, and vice versa. Row 1 of Table 4 shows that as one increases business-unit 
similarity (i.e. 4.0L  to )6.0H , the ratio increases from below 1 to above 1 by 9.3 per 
cent (0.97 to 1.06). We redo such an analysis in row 2 of Table 4, whereby we increase the 
advantage of the business units relative to the central unit in their ability to react to 
information decreases (i.e. the higher is
CU
BU


  ). The percentage increase in the ratio from 
low business-unit similarity to high similarity is the same compared to row 1 of Table 4 at 9.3 
per cent (0.96 to 1.05). We redo such analysis in row 3 of Table 4, whereby the cost of the 
central unit relative to the business unit decreases (i.e. the larger is  , the cost advantage of 
centralization over decentralization). The percentage increase in the ratio from low business-
unit similarity to high similarity is higher compared to row 1 at 11.2 per cent (0.98 to 1.09). 
The results of Table 4 are robust to other combinations of parameter values. These results 
give us Proposition 1. Proposition 1 also implies the reverse relationship, whereby a decrease 
in business-unit similarity means that decentralization becomes optimal. Such a reverse 
relationship gives us the corollary that Proposition 1 implies. 
 
Appendix 3. High Uncertainty 
We next examine the impact of high uncertainty on the decision to centralize data 
management. In order to do so, we need to specify the functional form for how business-unit 
similarity affects uncertainty in the environment, whereby the reduction in uncertainty is 
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higher when business units are dissimilar compared to when they are similar. In order to 
capture this relationship, we assume the following functional form: 
)exp(
1
2
p  if 5.00   and )ln( 05.0p  if 15.0      (3A) 
The above functional form has the property that when business-unit similarity is low 
(i.e. 5.00  ), the reduction in uncertainty is high compared to when business-unit 
similarity is high (i.e. 15.0  ). Let 5.0p  when uncertainty is high. Then, using (3A), 
we get a relatively large increase in probability to 85.0p  (i.e. )35.0p  when business-
unit similarity is low ( 4.0L ). In contrast, we get a relatively small increase in probability 
to 53.0p  (i.e. )03.0p  and when business similarity is high ( 6.0H ). We examine 
the decision to centralize or decentralize when the reduction in uncertainty makes the 
favorable outcome more likely.20 Since uncertainty changes with the degree of business-unit 
similarity (e.g. H and )L , we need to compare the percentage change in the ratio of the total 
surplus from centralization and decentralization as we vary the parameter values. Table 5 
provides the details of the percentage change in such a ratio for different parameter values. 
The region of interest for Table 5 does pass the Hessian test for optimization. 
 
Table 5. Percentage Change in Ratio of Expected Total Surplus from Centralization 
and Decentralization ( )5.0,8.0,5.0  CUp   
No. Parameter 
values when 
business-unit 
similarity is 
low  
 
p 0.35,  
to p 0.85 
Percentage change in 
][ LL
L
BA
C
EVEV
EV



 due to 
reduction in uncertainty 
when business-unit 
similarity is low 
Parameter 
values when 
business-unit 
similarity is 
high  
 
p 0.03 to 
p 0.53 
Percentage change in 
][ HH
H
BA
C
EVEV
EV



 due 
to reduction in 
uncertainty when 
business-unit similarity 
is high 
1 
 
L 0.4; 

CU
BU


1.1; 
 0.3 
5.41% 
H 0.6; 

CU
BU


1.1; 
 0.3 
0.89% 
2 L 0.4; 

CU
BU


1.2; 
 0.3 
10.48% 
H 0.6; 

CU
BU


1.2; 
 0.3 
1.67% 
3 L 0.3; 

CU
BU


1.1; 
 0.4 
5.41% 
H 0.6; 

CU
BU


1.1; 
 0.4 
0.89% 
 
                                                 
20 As discussed earlier, the case with an unfavorable outcome arguably implies that the firm is less likely to continue 
investing because the returns are less attractive and might fall below the minimum threshold. 
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 Table 5 shows the percentage change in the ratio of the expected total surplus from 
centralization over the expected total surplus from decentralization as uncertainty reduces 
when business-unit similarity is low compared to when it is high. A high percentage implies a 
larger increase in the ratio, implying that centralization creates more total surplus compared 
to decentralization when uncertainty reduces. Row 1 of Table 5 shows that as one increases 
business-unit similarity (i.e. 4.0L  to )6.0H , the percentage increase in ratio is low 
(0.89%) when business-unit similarity is high, compared to when business-unit similarity is 
low (5.41%). Moreover, when business-unit similarity is low the ratio changes from less than 
one to more than one as the uncertainty reduces by a larger amount, which implies that the 
decision to centralize becomes stronger. We redo such an analysis in row 2 of Table 5, 
whereby we increase the advantage of the business units relative to the central unit in their 
ability to react to information decreases (i.e. the higher is
CU
BU


  ). The percentage increase 
in the ratio from low business-unit similarity to high similarity is higher compared to row 1 of 
Table 5 (1.67% and 10.48% for high and low business-unit similarity respectively). We redo 
such an analysis in row 3, whereby the cost of the central unit relative to the business unit 
decreases (i.e. the larger is  , the cost advantage of centralization over decentralization). The 
percentage increase in the ratio from low business-unit similarity to high similarity is the 
same compared to row 1 of Table 5 (0.89% and 5.41% for high and low business-unit 
similarity respectively). In general, the larger reduction in uncertainty when business-unit 
similarity is low compared to when it is high enables the total surplus for centralization to 
increase more than decentralization, which favors centralization. The results of Table 5 are 
robust to other combinations of parameter values. These results give us Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2 also implies the reverse relationship, whereby an increase in business-unit 
similarity means that decentralization becomes optimal. Such a reverse relationship gives us 
the corollary that Proposition 2 implies. 
